Continuous monitoring of a network domain poses several challenges. First, routers of a network domain need to be polled periodically to collect statistics about delay, loss, and bandwidth. Second, this huge amount of data has to be mined to obtain useful monitoring information. This increases the overhead for high speed core routers, and restricts the monitoring process from scaling to a large number of flows. To achieve scalability, polling and measurements that involve core routers should be avoided. We design and evaluate a distributed monitoring scheme that uses only edge-to-edge measurements, and scales well to large network domains. In our scheme, all edge routers form an overlay network with their neighboring edge routers. The network is probed intelligently from nodes in the overlay to detect congestion in both directions of a link. The proposed scheme requires significantly fewer number of probes than existing monitoring schemes. Through analytic study and a series of experiments, we show that the proposed scheme can effectively identify the congested links. The congested links are used to capture the misbehaving flows that are violating their service level agreements, or attacking the domain by injecting excessive traffic.
Introduction
Continuous monitoring of a network domain is necessary to ensure proper operation of the network by detecting possible service violations and attacks. Attackers can impersonate a legitimate customer by spoofing flow identities. Network filtering [15] at routers can detect such spoofing if the attacker and the impersonated customer are in different domains. Otherwise, the attacks remain undetected. The quality of service (QoS) enabled networks face QoS attacks. In this setting, the attacker is a regular user of the network trying to get more resources (a better service class) than what it has signed (paid) for. A QoS network provides different classes of service for different cost, which can entice attackers to steal bandwidth and other network resources. Such attacks involve injecting traffic into the network with the intent to steal bandwidth or to cause QoS degradation, by causing other customers' flows to experience longer delays, higher loss rates, and lower throughput. Taken to an extreme, this may result in a denial of service (DoS) attack.
A large variety of network monitoring tools can be found in [17] . Many tools use SNMP [9] , RMON [28], or NetFlow [11] , which are built-in functionality for most routers. Using these mechanisms, a centralized or decentralized model can be built to monitor a network. The centralized approach to monitor network latency, jitter, loss, throughput, or other QoS parameters suffers from scalability. One way to achieve scalability is to use a hierarchical architecture [2, 27] . Subramanyan et al [27] design a SNMP-based distributed network monitoring system that organizes monitoring agents and managers in a hierarchical fashion. Both centralized or decentralized models obtain monitoring data by polling each router of a network domain, which limits the ability of a system to scale for large number of flows. The alternative way of polling is to use an event reporting mechanism that sends useful information typically in a summarized format only when the status of a monitored element changes. A more flexible way of network monitoring is by using mobile agents [20] or programmable architecture [3] . However, periodic polling or deploying agents in high speed core routers put non-trivial overhead on them. We propose a very low overhead monitoring scheme that does not involve core routers for any kind of measurements. Our assumption is that if a network domain is properly provisioned and no user is misbehaving, the flows traversing through the domain should not experience a high delay or a high loss. An excessive traffic due to attacks changes the internal characteristics of a network domain. This change of internal characteristics is a key point to monitor a network domain.
Edge-to-edge monitoring scheme is studied in [16] , which devises a network monitoring mechanism to detect attacks on QoS domains using network tomography [6, 14] . This monitoring mechanism measures the service level agreement (SLA) parameters, and compares these measurements with the values negotiated between a service provider and a user. To infer SLA parameters, the tomography-based scheme constructs a tree from the network topology, and probes the leaves from the root. Probing from the root to all leaves can not infer SLA parameters in both directions of a link. This can be achieved with much higher overhead. Our goal in this work is to devise a low overhead monitoring scheme that can detect attacks in both directions of all links in a network domain.
The proposed monitoring scheme has two phases. In the first phase, we continuously measure edge-toedge link delays to observe any unusual delay pattern. All ingress routers (entry points) sample the incoming traffic to probe delay of the paths followed by a user packet. This measures the delay experienced by a user inside the domain. If the delay is higher than a pre-defined threshold (SLA value), the edge routers conduct intelligent probing for loss measurements. For this probing, an overlay network is formed using all edge routers on top of the physical network. The probing does not calculate loss ratio for each individual link, instead, the congested links with high losses are identified using edge-to-edge loss measurements. We provide two methods to identify congested links: simple method and advanced method. In the simple method, all edge routers probe their neighbors in clockwise and counter-clockwise direction. This method requires only O(n) probing, where n is the number of edge routers. Through extensive analysis, both analytical and experimental, we show that the simple method is very powerful to identify the congested links to a close approximation. We provide an advanced method that searches the topology tree intelligently for probes that can be used to refine the solution of simple method, if necessary. When the network is less than 20% congested the advanced method requires O(n) probes. If the congestion is high, it requires more probes, however, does not exceed O(n). In the second phase of our monitoring process, we use the congested links as a basis to identify edge routers through which traffic are entering into and exiting from the domain. From exiting edge routers, we identify the flows that are violating any SLA agreement. If the SLA is violated for delay and loss, the network is probed to detect whether any user is stealing bandwidth. The service violations can indicate a possible attack on the same domain, or on a downstream domain. In case of a DoS attack, numerous flows from different sources are destined to a victim. These flows aggregate on their way as they get closer to the victim. Monitoring an upstream network domain can detect these high bandwidth aggregates that could result in DoS attacks on downstream domains [16, 21] . To control the attacks, filters are activated at edge routers through which flows are entering into a network domain.
Using simulation, we conduct a series of experiments to evaluate the proposed monitoring scheme. We conclude that the distributed monitoring scheme shows a promise for an efficient and scalable monitoring of a domain. This scheme can detect service violations, bandwidth theft attacks, and tell when many flows are aggregating towards a downstream domain for a possible DoS attack. The scheme requires low monitoring overhead, and detects service violations in both directions of any link in a network domain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The related work is discussed in Section 2. Measuring all necessary network parameters for monitoring purposes is presented in Section 3. This section discusses our proposed monitoring scheme, and analyzes its strength and limitations. Section 4 explains how to use the monitoring scheme to detect service violations and DoS attacks. Experimental results and discussions are provided in Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
Related Work
One common way of monitoring is to log packets at various points throughout the network and then extract information to discover the path of any packet [24] . This scheme is useful to trace an attack long after the attack has been accomplished. The effectiveness of logging is limited by the huge storage requirements especially for high speed networks. Stone [26] suggested to create a virtual overlay network connecting all edge routers of a provider to reroute interesting flows through tunnels to central tracking routers. After examination, suspicious packets are dropped. This approach also requires a great amount of logging capacity.
Many proposals for network monitoring [5, 12] give designs to manage the network and ensure that the system is operating within desirable parameters. In efficient reactive monitoring [12] , the authors discuss ways to monitor communication overhead in IP networks. Their main idea is to combine global polling with local event driven reporting to monitor a network. Breitbart et al [5] identify effective techniques to monitor bandwidth and latency in IP networks. The authors present probing-based techniques where path latencies are measured by transmitting probes from a single point of control. They describe algorithms for computing an optimal set of probes to measure latency of paths in a network, whereas we focus on measuring parameters using distributed agents.
In [10] , a histogram-based aggregation algorithm is used to detect SLA violations. The algorithm measures network characteristics on a hop-by-hop basis, uses them to compute end-to-end measurements, and validates end-to-end SLA requirements. In large networks, efficient collection of management data is a challenging task. While exhaustive data collection yields a complete picture, there is an added overhead. The authors propose an aggregation and refinement based monitoring approach. The approach assumes that the routes used by SLA flows are known, citing VPN and MPLS [8] provisioning. Though routes are known for double-ended SLAs that specify both ingress and egress points in the network, they are unknown in cases where the scope of the service is not limited to a fixed egress point. Like RON [4] , we check violations using average values in a recent time frame. This reduces constraints on the network setup, and the need for knowledge of the set of flows traversing each router. Duffield et al [13] use packet "stripes" (back-to-back probe packets) to infer link loss by computing the correlation of packet loss within a stripe at the destinations. This work is an extension of loss inference for multicast traffic, described in [1, 7] . The stripe-based probing mechanism is adopted to monitor loss characteristics inside a domain without relying on the core routers [16] . To infer loss, a series of probe packets, called a stripe, are sent from one edge router to two other edge routers with no delay between the transmissions of successive (usually three) packets. For example, in a two-leaf binary tree spanned by nodes 0, k, R 1 , R 2 , stripes are sent from the root 0 to the leaves to estimate the characteristics of one link, say k → R 1 (Figure 1 ). The first two packets of a 3-packet stripe are sent to R 2 and the last one to R 1 . If a packet reaches any receiver, we can infer that the packet must have reached the branch point k. If R 2 gets both packets of a stripe, it is likely that R 1 will receive the last packet of the stripe. The transmission probability A k for node k can be calculated knowing how many packets are sent from the root and how many of them received by both receiver. Using A k and number of packets reach to R 1 and R 2 , we can calculate the successful transmission probability of the link k → R 1 . Similarly, a complementary stripe is sent to estimate the characteristics of link k → R 2 . By combining estimates of stripes down each such tree, the characteristics of the common path from 0 → k is estimated. This inference technique extends to general trees by sending probes from root to each ordered pair of leaves [13] . Ji and Elwalid [18] show that measurement-based monitoring using tree is scalable when the probe packets reach the edge routers with high probability. If the internal loss is very high, the solution does not scale for a large network.
The unicast probing scheme is extended in [16] for routers with active queue management. This scheme is used to monitor loss inside a QoS network domain. The stripe-based monitoring scheme requires less overhead than core-based monitoring. In this paper, we propose a scalable scheme that requires much less probes than stripe-based scheme. Kim et al [19] collect statistical data from every single router for each service class and then analyze the data to compute edge-to-edge QoS of aggregate IP flows. This approach has very high overhead, and not suitable for real time monitoring.
Measurements with Distributed Probing
The service level agreement (SLA) parameters such as delay, packet loss, and throughput are measured to ensure that all users are getting their target share of resources. Delay is the edge-to-edge latency. Packet loss is the ratio of total number of packets dropped from a flow 1 to the total number of packets of the same flow entering into the domain. Throughput is the total bandwidth consumed by a flow inside a domain. Delay and loss are important parameters to monitor in a network domain. Bandwidth measurement is used to detect whether any flow is getting more than its share of resources, which causes other flows to suffer. Although jitter (a delay variation) is another important SLA parameter, it is flow-specific and, therefore, is not suitable to use in network monitoring. A large body of research has focused on measuring delay, loss, and throughput in the Internet [22, 23] . In this section, we describe techniques to measure each parameter. Delay and throughput measurements are discussed in details in [16] . This paper proposes an efficient way that detect links with high losses using edge-to-edge measurements.
The distributed monitoring scheme measures SLA components and compares the measurements to the predefined values to detect service violation. There is one monitoring agent that gets feedback from all other edge routers about delay, loss, and throughput. The monitoring agent can sit on any edge router in the network domain.
Delay Measurements
To measure delay, the ingress routers copy the IP header of incoming packet into a new packet with a certain pre-configured probability. Copying the header from user traffic to measure delay has a couple of benefits. First, the probe packet follows the same path as the user traffic because the route inside a domain does not change too often. Hence, the probe delay is similar to the delay experienced by the user. Second, if some links do not have any traffic, the links will not be probed, which saves the probing overhead.
The router encodes the current timestamp t ingress into the payload and marks the protocol field of the IP header with a new value. An egress router recognizes such packets and removes them from the network. Additionally, the egress router computes the edge-to-edge link delay for a packet from the difference between its own time and t ingress . We ignore minor drifts of the clocks since all routers are in one administrative domain and can be synchronized fairly accurately. The egress classifies the probe packet as belonging to flow i of user j, and update the average packet delay, avg delay i j , for delay sample delay i j (t) at time t using an exponential weighted moving average (EWMA):
where α is a small fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 to emphasize recent history rather than the current sample alone. The egress router sends the average delay to the monitor. If the average packet delay of path k exceeds the delay guarantee in the SLA SLA i delay for flow i, i.e. avg delay k > SLA i delay , it is an indication of an SLA violation. If the network is properly provisioned and flows do not misbehave, there should not be any delay greater than SLA i delay for any flow i. A high delay can be caused by some flows that are violating their SLAs or bypassing the SLA checking, which is an attack.
If the delay exceeds a certain threshold, the monitor needs to probe the network for loss and throughput. We discuss the throughput measurement first, and then discuss the loss estimation to isolate congested links. Identifying the congested links is necessary to detect egress and ingress routers involved in high traffic paths, which helps to detect and control attacks.
Throughput Measurements
The objective of checking throughput violation is to ensure that nobody is consuming any extra bandwidth (beyond the SLA). The attackers can send a lot of best effort (BE) traffic to consume bandwidth, because BE traffic is not controlled at the ingress routers. Consumption of excess bandwidth by any flow can deteriorate the QoS for many others. This can not be detected by a single ingress or egress router, if the user sends through multiple ingress routers at a rate lower than the SLA. For each ingress router, the user does not violate the SLA but as a whole he does. The service provider may allow a user to take extra bandwidth as long as everybody else is not harmed. This depends on the policy of the service provider.
The monitor measures throughput by probing globally all egress routers when the monitor suspects any violation in delay and loss. Egress routers of a QoS domain maintain the aggregate flow rate for each user. This rate is a close approximation of the bandwidth consumption by each flow inside the domain [16] . When the monitor gets throughput of all flows from egress routers, it calculates the throughput for user j, as:
, where B ij is bandwidth consumed by user j at edge router i and N is the total number of edges. If SLA j bw is the bandwidth guarantee for user j, B j > SLA j bw indicates an SLA violation by user j. To detect bandwidth theft that does not change delay or loss pattern, the monitor can periodically poll egress routers.
Loss Measurements
Packet loss guarantees made by a provider network to a customer are for the packet losses experienced by its conforming traffic inside the provider domain. Measuring loss by observing packet drops at all core routers is an easy task. It imposes, however, an excessive overhead on the core routers by forcing them to record each drop entry, and periodically sending it to the monitor. The stripe-based approach is an edge-to-edge mechanism, described in Section 2, to measure loss in a domain.
We follow a different strategy. An interesting observation is that service violation can be detected without exact loss value of each internal link, instead, it requires to check whether a link has loss higher than the specified threshold or not. We propose a new approach to detect links with high losses by edge-to-edge measurements. The link with a high loss is referred to as a congested link. The distributed probing detects all congested links using edge-to-edge loss measurements. These links are used to detect flows that pose threats to other flows by consuming extra resources. To apply our distributed probing, we convert the network topology into tree structure. This converting mechanism is discussed later in this section. The tree contains core routers as internal nodes and edge routers as leaf nodes. Any leaf can be used to put a monitoring agent that collects statistics from other edge routers to check SLA violations. The probing agents sit only at the edge routers and knows their neighbors. The neighbors are determined by visiting the tree using depth first search algorithm starting from any edge router, and putting all edge routers in an ordered sequence. All probing agents form a virtual network on top of the physical network. The probes follow edge-to-edge path in the virtual network. We equivalently refer the tree topology or the virtual network to an overlay network. A typical spanning tree of the topology, the corresponding overlay network, direction of all internal links for each probe are shown in Figure 2 . The following definitions and observations are used to describe the properties of the overlay network, and to identify congested links in the proposed simple and advanced method. Figure 2 , the core routers C4 and C5 are the terminal core routers.
Definition 1 Overlay Network. To connect all edge routers with their neighbors in a network domain, we build a virtual network and define as an overlay network. The edge routers use this overlay for probing.

Definition 2 Terminal core router. A core router, which is connected to only one other core router in an overlay network is called a terminal core router. In
Definition 3 Probe path.
A probe path P is a sequence of routers (either core or edge) < E 1 , C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n , E n > where a router appears in the sequence only once and a physical link exists between two adjacent routers. A probe packet originates at the edge router E 1 , passes through the core routers C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n−1 , and C n , in the given order, and terminates at the edge router E n . We also represent the probe path P by the set of links, 
Lemma 2 In an overlay network, every core router is connected to at least three other routers.
Proof: If a core router C is connected to two routers only, C together with its two connecting links can be replaced by a single link (by Lemma 1). If C is a terminal core router and C is not connected to any edge router, that is, C is connected to only one other router, C can never be included in a probe path and can be simply removed. Hence, an overlay network can be constructed in which all core routers are connected to at least three other routers.
2
Lemma 3 An overlay network can be constructed in such a way that every terminal core router is connected to at least two edge routers.
Proof: Since a terminal core router t is connected to only one other core router (by Definition 1), if t is not connected to at least two edge routers, t can be removed from the network (by Lemma 1). Therefore, an overlay network can be constructed, where every terminal core router is connected to at least two edge routers. 
Simple Method
In this solution, we conduct total two rounds of probing. One in the counter-clockwise direction, and another round of probing in the clock-wise direction from any edge router. The former one is referred to as first round of probing, and the latter one is referred to as second round of probing. In each round, probing is done in parallel.
We describe the loss monitoring scheme with a simple network topology. In this example, Figure 3b , edge router 1 probes the path 1 → 3, router 3 probes the path 3 → 4, and 4 probes the path 4 → 1. Let P i,j be a boolean variable that represents the outcome of a probe between edge routers i to j. P i,j takes on value 1 if the measured loss exceeds the threshold in any link within the probe path, and 0 otherwise. Notice that P i,j = 0 for i = j. We express the outcome of a probe in terms of combination of all link status. Let X i,j be a boolean variable to represent the congestion status of an internal link i → j. We refer X to a congestion variable in this paper. For Figure 3c , we can write equations as follows:
where (+) represents a boolean "OR" operation. We express status of internal links of any probe path of a network topology in terms of probe outcomes. The equation with all internal links on probe path P i,j and its outcome P i,j for an arbitrary topology is shown below.
Note that loss in path 1 → 3 might not be same as loss in path 3 → 1. This path asymmetry phenomenon is shown in [25] . In general, X i,j is independent of X j,i , ∀ ij , i = j.
The second round of probing, Figure 3 (a), is done from 1 → 4, 4 → 3, and 3 → 1. We express the outcome of this round of probing in terms of internal links as follows:
The sets of equations (2 and 4) are used to detect congested link in the network. For example, if the outcome of the probing shows P 1,3 = 1, P 1,4 = 1, and rest are 0, we get the following:
All other probes do not see congestion on its path, i.e., X 3,2 = X 2,4 = X 4,2 = X 2,1 = X 2,3 = 0. Thus, the equation set (5) reduces to X 1,2 = 1. Similarly, if any of the single link is congested, we can isolate the congested link. Suppose, two of the links, X 1,2 and X 2,3 , are congested. The outcome of probing will be P 1,3 = 1, P 1,4 = 1, and P 4,3 = 1, which makes X 3,2 = X 2,4 = X 4,2 = X 2,1 = 0. This leaves the solution as shown in equation (6) . Thus, the distributed scheme can isolate links with high loss in this topology.
Analysis of Simple Method. The strength of simple method comes from the fact that congestion variables in one equation of any round of probing is distributed over several equations in the other round of probing. If n variables appear in one equation in the first round of probing, no two (out of the n) variables appear in same equation in second round of probing (Lemma 4) or vice versa. This property helps to solve the equation sets because congestion in any probe path of any round is totally spread over several equations in other round. Theorem 1 shows that if any single probe path is congested with arbitrary number of links, the simple method can identify all the congested links. In Theorem 2, we show that the simple method determines the status of a link with very high probability when the network is less congested.
Lemma 4
If P and P are probe paths in the first and the second round of probing respectively, |P ∩ P | ≤ 1.
Theorem 1 If only one probe path P is shown to be congested in the first round of probing, the simple method successfully identifies each congestion link in P.
Proof: Let, the congested probe path be P = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l k } and X i is the congestion variable for link l i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k. X i appears once in equations for each round of probing. Let, X m is in equation X m + f (S) = 1 in the second round of probing, where S is a set of congestion variables excluding X i that appear in the equation. The expression f (S) does not contain any of the variables
. From first round of probing, we obtain f (S) = 0, because the outcome of all probe paths except P is zero in this round. Thus, we can determine X i , which is 1, hence the status of the link l i , for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Figure 4 : Probability that the simple method determines the status of a link of any arbitrary topology with only 2n probes, where n is the number of edge router in the topology. The simple method performs extremely well when less than 20% links of a network are congested. If a network is more than 50% congested, the simple method can not contribute much.
Theorem 2 Let p be the probability of a link being congested in any arbitrary overlay network. The simple method determines the status of any link of the topology with probability at least
Proof: Let a particular link l appears in probe paths P 1 and P 2 in first and second round of probing. The status of a link can be either non-congested or congested. We consider both cases separately and then combine the results.
When l is non-congested. The status of l can be determined if the rest of the links in either p 1 or p 2 are non congested. There are also some other cases where the status of l can be determined. Let the length of probe paths P 1 and P 2 are i and k respectively. Since, only common link between paths P 1 and P 2 is l (Lemma 4), the following two events are independent: Event 1 =all other links in p 1 are non-congested and Event 2 =all other links in p 2 are non-congested. Thus, for a non-congested link, P r{status of l be determined}
Now, we estimate the average value of i and k. In our overlay network, the number of links are 2(e + c − 1) considering both directions of a link. The edge routers are leaves of the topology tree whereas the core routers are the internal nodes of the tree. Number of leaf nodes is always greater than the number of internal nodes. Thus, the number of links is ≤ 2(e + e − 1) = 4e. Number of probe paths in any round (first or second) of probing is e and every link appears exactly once in each round. So, the average length of a path ≤ 4e e = 4. Using the average length for the probe paths, i.e., i = k = 4, P r{Status of l be determined}
When l is congested. If l is a congested link, its status can be determined when all other links that appear on the probe path of l are determined to be non-congested. As, the average path length is 4 in the simple method, the probability that a path has all non-congested links is (1 − p) 4 . To determine the status of all 3 links that appear with l in a equation, all 3 of them have to non-congested and determined. Thus, P r{Status of l be determined} = (1 − p) 12 .
For any link l (congested or non-congested) P r{Status of l be determined}
2 Figure 4 shows the probability to determine status of a link with probability that a network is congested. This figure shows that simple method determines status of a link with probability more than 0.60 when 20% links of a network are congested. For 30% congestion, the probability is higher than 0.40. The simple method does not help much when 50% links of a network is congested. In that case, we use the advanced method, which is described in this section. This result is validated with the simulation result for two different topologies.
Having congestion on links that affect multiple probe paths might eventually lead to some boolean equations that do not have unique solutions. Thus, the solution of simple method can have congested links and some undecided links. In that case, we can either use a special set of probes that were not used before (discussed in Section 3.3.2), or apply stripe-based probing to a part of the tree to determine the exact locations of the congested links. Alternatively, we can even report all the links from the unsolved equations at the end of simple method as congested. These links are referred to as false positive because some non-congested links are reported as congested. The false positive is calculated as a ratio of undecided links labeled as congested by simple method to the total number links in the network. We further analyze the simple method when a network has congestion that spreads from one edge router to any other edge routers. In real network, numerous flows come from different edge routers and make a series of links to be congested. In this case, the simple method performs very well. We observe that for edge-to-edge congested paths, the simple method does not add any link as false positive. We plot this behavior for both topologies with all possible edge-to-edge paths in Figure 6 . On the average, the simple method can isolate more than 50% of the congested links for edge-to-edge congestion scenario. Rest of the cases, the solutions have some equations with more than one variable. We can apply advanced method to be sure about the status of these links. The percentage of identified links is little high for the path length=6 in case of Topology 1, Figure 6 . Because this path has more shared links comparing to other paths. 
Advanced Method
The solution of the simple method might have some false positive links. As the percentage of false positive links is small comparing to the overall links of the topology, we can proceed to the detection phase with the solution of simple method considering the undecided links as congested. Alternatively, we can refine the solution of the simple method to discard the false positive links. Then the output of the simple method is used as the input of the advanced method. Let the set of equations with undecided variables be E. Now, we traverse the topology tree to find probes that can help to decide about the values for each undecided variable.
The algorithm of the advanced method is shown in Figure 7 . For each variable in equation set E, we need to probe the network that helps to decide the variable. Each probe needs one start node and one end node. The algorithm shows functions to find start and end probe nodes. Link direction plays an important role to find these probes. The link direction is defined in Definition 4. For example, in Figure 2 , if link C1 → C3 is congested, the start probe node can be E2, E5, or E7. On the other hand, if link C3 → C1 is congested, the start probing node can be E3, E4, or E5.
For an undecided link v i → v j , the function FindNode looks for leaves descended from node v i and v j . First, the algorithm searches for a node in IN on a subtree descended from v i and then in OUT direction on a subtree descended from v j . For any node v, the DecidePath explores all siblings of v to choose a path in a specified direction. The function avoids previously visited path and known congested path. It marks already visited path so that same path will not be repeated in exploration of an alternate path.
If the network is congested in a way that no solution is possible, the AdvancedMethod can not add anything to the simple method. If there is a solution, the AdvancedMethod can obtain probes to decide about links because this probe finding is an exhaustive search on the topology tree to find leaf-to-leafs path that are not already congested.
Analysis of Advanced Method. The number of probes required in advanced method depends on the number of congested links existing in a network. The advanced method starts with the undecided links. When the network is sparely congested or densely congested, the algorithm exits with fewer run and the number of trial for each congestion variable is low. To obtain how many trials we need to identify the status of each link, we need the average length of a probe path d and on how many paths b a link lies on. For an arbitrary overlay network, we calculate the approximated value of d and b in Lemma 6 and Lemma 5 respectively. Using these two values we show that, Theorem 3, the advanced method identifies the status of a link in O(n) probing with a very high probability when the network is 20% congested or less.
Lemma 5 For an arbitrary overlay network with e edge routers, on the average a link lies on e(3e−2)
8 ln e edge-to- Figure 2a . The X-axis is the probability that a link to be congested. The Y-axis is the probability that a good path (noncongested) exists for any link. The dotted graph shows the probability that a good path exists. The solid graph shows the probability that a good and decided path (from the first round) exists.
edge paths.
Proof: See Appendix B.
2 Proof: The probability that a path of length d is non-congested (1 − p) d . The probability of having all b paths congested is
Lemma 6 For an arbitrary overlay network with e edge routers, the average length of all edge-to-edge paths is
Thus, the probability that at least one non-congested path exists is 1
The performance of the advanced method is plot in Figure 8 for Topology 1. This figure shows the probability that a good (non-congested) path exists for any link. Two graphs are shown: one shows the probability that a good path exists and the other shows the probability that a good as well as decided path exists. The advanced method needs only one probe on the average to identify the status of the link when the network is less than 20% congested. In this case, the total required probes is O(n). Some links might need more than one, which is not high because a good and decided path exists. If the network is more than 50% congested, the advanced method can not find a good path easily because the path does not exist, and the advanced method terminates quickly. When the network is highly congested, we need to check almost all the flows. So, we can go to the detection phase instead of wasting time to rule out very few good links. Then, the results are aggregated to get overall picture of a network.
General Network Topology
The simple and the advanced methods are applicable to a network topology with a tree structure only. If there is any loop in the topology or multiple paths from one edge router to another edge router, we need to preprocess the topology before applying the algorithm. First, we split the topology into a spanning tree, and a set of subtrees that may be connected or not. The algorithm is applied to all trees to identify the congested links. We might have multiple probe paths from one edge router to another. In this case, we apply source routing for probe packets to follow the specified route. Some of the subtrees may not be connected to edge routers, i.e., some parts of subtrees may consist of only core routers. To probe those links, we need to connect them to edge routers. We should be careful to connect these internal links with non-congested links. When all subtrees are probed, we need to combine them. As probing any path does not affect other paths, applying our scheme on split tree will not affect each other. We obtain the union of all congested links from each topology as a final set of congested links for the whole topology. In Figure 9 , the general topology (Figure 9a ) is split into two trees. The first one (Figure 9b ) is a spanning tree for the general topology. The other one (Figure 9c ) is a tree where two core routers are not connected to any edge router. We need to add links to these core routers so that we can access this link from edge routers. When probing on Figure 9b is done we select some good links to connect these core routers with the edge routers. At the end, all results can be combined together to reflect the overall status of the topology. The topology preprocessing is done infrequently only when a network is setup, and when any link or router is added.
Limitations of Distributed Monitoring
There are some limitations for the distributed monitoring approach. For example, in Figure 3a , if both X 2,3 and X 2,4 are congested, we can not decide about X 2,3 . Because we need at least one non-congested outgoing link from core router 2 to decide about the link X 1,2 . The argument is the same for X 2,1 when both X 3,2 and X 4,2 are congested. If all links have the same bandwidth, we can report all three links as congested. Even if X 1,2 (X 2,1 ) has the combined capacity of the two outgoing (incoming) links, the argument is still valid. In such case, the algorithm will report one non-congested link as congested, which is a close approximation of actual result. Each terminal core has at least two edge routers (by Lemma 3). As long as any non-congested core → edge link exists, our method can provide partial solution.
The worst case is when all links from edge routers to core routers are congested in a network domain. In this case, outcome of all probes will be congested. The solution of the simple and advanced method is all links are congested. This solution is useful because it is very likely that the whole network is congested when all edge → core links are congested. Thus, we can also go to the detection phase considering the whole network is congested. This is also true when all core → edge links are congested. If some combinations of E → C or C → E are not congested, we can use them to provide a partial solution for the network.
Detecting Violations and Attacks
Violation Detection
Violation detection is the second phase of our monitoring process. When delay, loss, and bandwidth consumption exceed the pre-defined thresholds, the monitor decides whether the network experiences a possible SLA violation. The monitor knows the existing traffic classes and the acceptable SLA parameters per class. For each service class, we obtain bounds on each SLA parameter that is be used as a threshold. A high delay is an indication of abnormal behavior inside a network domain. If there is any loss for the guaranteed traffic class, and if the loss ratios for other traffic classes exceed certain levels, an SLA violation is flagged. This loss can be caused by some flows consuming bandwidths above their SLA bw . Bandwidth theft is checked by comparing the total bandwidth obtained by a user against the user's SLA bw . The misbehaving flows are controlled at the ingress routers.
Detecting DoS Attacks
To detect DoS attacks, set of links L with high loss are identified. For each congested link, l(v i , v j ) ∈ L, the tree is divided into two subtrees: one formed by leaves descendant from v i and the other from the leaves descendant from v j . The former subtree has egress routers as leaves through which high aggregate bandwidth flows are leaving. If many exiting flows have the same destination IP prefix, either this is a DoS attack or they are going to a popular site [21] . Decision is taken by consulting the destination entity. In case of an attack, we control it by triggering filters at the ingress routers, which are leaves of the subtree descendant from v i and feeding flows to the congested link. For each violation, the monitor takes action such as throttling a particular user's traffic using a flow control mechanism.
A scenario of detecting and controlling DoS attack is now illustrated using Figure 10a . Suppose, the victim's domain D is connected to the edge router E6. The monitor observes that links C3 → C4 and link C4 → E6 are congested for a specified time duration ∆t sec. From both congested links, we obtain the egress router E6 through which most of these flows are leaving. The destination IP prefix matching at E6 reveals that an excess amount of traffic is heading towards the domain D connected to E6. To control the attack, the monitor needs to identify the ingress routers through which the suspected flows are entering into the domain. The algorithm to identify these ingress routers is discussed in next subsection.
Flow Aggregation and Filtering
An important question is how to identify ingress routers through which the flows are entering into the domain. To identify the flow aggregation, we use delay probes and assign an ID to each router. An ingress router puts its ID on the delay probe packet. The egress router knows from which ingress routers the packets are coming. For example, in Figure 10a , say egress router E6 is receiving flows from E1, E2, E3, and E5. These flows aggregate during their trip to E6, and makes the link C4 → E6 congested. We traverse the path backwards from the egress router to the ingress routers through the congested link to obtain the entry points of the flows that are causing attacks. In this example, all edge routers can feed the congested links and they all will be candidates for activating filters. Knowing the ingress routers and congested links, we figure out the entering routers for the flows that are causing the attacks. 
Simulation Results
The performance of our monitoring mechanism is evaluated using simulation. Attacks are simulated to show that the edge routers can detect service violations and attacks due to flow aggregation towards a downstream domain. First, we provide experiments on parameter measurements to show the algorithms described in Section 3 work properly. Then, we conduct experiments on detecting service violations and attacks.
Measuring Parameters and Monitoring
We use a network topology shown in Figure 10a , which is similar to the one used in [13, 16] to evaluate stripe-based loss ratio approximations. We want to compare our distributed monitoring with the stripe-based monitoring scheme. Figure 10b is a more complex topology, which is used to show what happen when multiple attacks happen simultaneously and one changes the behavior of the others. Multiple domains (not shown in the Figure 10 ) are connected to the edge routers for both topologies to create flows along all links in the domain. In Topology 1, flows coming through E1, E2, E3 are destined to edge router E6 to make the link C4 → E6 congested. Many other flows are created to ensure that all links carry a significant number of flows.
Interested readers are referred to [16] for detail analysis of our delay and throughput measurement techniques. In this paper, we show how delay pattern changes with excessive traffic in a domain. We measure delay when the network is properly provisioned or over-provisioned (and thus experiences little loss). When idle, the edge-to-edge delay of E1 → E6 link is 100 ms; E1 → E7 delay is 100 ms; and E5 → E4 delay is 160 ms. When there is an attack, the average delay of the E1 → E6 link is increased to as high as 180 ms. Figure 11 shows how the delay increases in presence of attacks that inject extra traffic into the domain. When there is no attack, the edge-to-edge delay is close to the link transmission delay. If the network path E1 → E6 is lightly loaded, for example with a 30% load, the delay does not go significantly higher than the link transmission delay. Even when the path is 60% loaded (medium load in Figure 11 ), the edge-to-edge delay of link E1 → E6 increases by less than 30%. Some instantaneous values of delay go as high as 50% of the link transmission delay but the EWMA does not fluctuate a lot. In this example, the network is properly provisioned, i.e., the flows do not violate the SLAs. In contrast, an excess traffic introduced by an attacker increases the edge-to-edge delay inside a network domain. In case of attack, most of the packets of attack traffic experience a delay 40-70% higher (Figure 11 ) than the link delay. Delay measurement is thus a good indication of the presence of excess traffic inside a network domain. Now, we demonstrate how the distributed probing to detect congested links in a network domain. Some of the hosts that are connected to domains attached with the edge routers violate SLAs. The inject more traffic through multiple ingress routers to conduct an attack on link C4 → E6. The intensity of the attack is increased during the interval from t=15 seconds to t=45 seconds. The attack causes around 35% of packet drops except an initial jump at 15 sec.
To identify the congested links, the edge routers probe to their neighbors. Figure 12 shows that Probe 46 in counterclockwise direction and probe 57 in clockwise direction experience high losses. Other probes do not face high losses, that is, most of the internal links are not congested. It is important to note that Probe 46 experiences high loss but Probe 64, which is in the opposite direction to Probe 46, faces very small amount of loss. This verifies that link loss in both directions of a link can be very different, based on the traffic load on each direction. Using algorithm specified in Section 3, we detect that link C4 → E6 is the only congested link in the domain. All points in the Figure 12 are calculated by taking averages of samples over one second time period. If we take the average over a longer time period, we can avoid this high fluctuations of loss. Figure 13 shows that taking averages over a longer time period reduces the chance of considering a non-congested link as congested. We observe that taking averages over a longer time period helps more in reducing the fluctuations than in increasing the number of probes per second. The actual loss for this congested link is very high (Figure 14) , which verifies that the distributed probing is able to detect links with high losses. 
Local Vs. Global Congestion
In this section, we address the question what happens if the congestion status is changed during our probing.
To show an example, we use the Topology 2 ( Figure 10b ). This topology is more complex and we simulate congestion in such a way that congestion in one area might affect the congestion of another area. Two attacks are simulated in this case. The first attack (Attack 1) is due to excessive flows coming from different edge routers and makes the C4 → E5 link congested. All of the probes in the first round are good except "Probe 45". This attack continues up to time T = 50 sec ( Figure 15 ) At time 50 sec, we have another attack (Attack 2), which is more severe than Attack 1. This attack causes several links on "Probe 34" path congested. It is interesting to note that Attack 2 actually causes Attack 1 to be disappeared from the scenario. Because most of the traffic causes attack on link C4 → E5 are now dropped earlier in their path due to Attack 1 ( Figure 15 ). This experiment shows that a local congestion might disappear due a global and severe congestion. The main objective of our work is to pin point a congestion. However, if the congestion is changed while an experiment is being conducted it catches the latest congestion. The simple method can complete two rounds of probing within 10 − 20 sec. If both rounds of probing are done in parallel, it takes only 10 sec. If a congestion does last for 20 sec, we believe that no action is necessary to alleviate it. 
Probe 45 Probe 34 Figure 15 : Attack 1 causes link C4 → E5 congested. However, Attack 2 comes from all different edge routers to E4, which causes the traffic of Attack 1 to drop early. As a result Probe 45 is not congested after 50 sec.
Detecting Attacks
A major advantage of using the SLA monitor is that it is able to detect denial of service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks in a network domain. When the monitor detects an anomaly (a high delay or a high loss), it polls the edge devices to obtain the throughput of existing flows. The QoS egress routers measure the outgoing rate of each flow. Using these rates, the monitor computes the total bandwidth consumption by any particular user. For details of throughput approximation, readers are referred to [16] . This bandwidth obtained by an user is compared to the SLA bw of that user. If any flow gets very high bandwidth than it should, a DDoS attack is flagged. A DoS attack in a downstream domain can be detected by identifying the congested links, and the egress routers connected to the congested links. Using destination IP address prefix matching [21] , we check whether many flows are aggregating towards a specific network or host. Consulting with the destination object, we control these flows at the ingress routers, if necessary. We demonstrate the detection of no attack and severe attack. "No attack" means no significant traffic in excess of the capacity. This scenario has little loss inside the network domain. This is the normal case of proper network provisioning and enforcing traffic conditioning at the edge routers. A severe attack injects excessive traffic into the network domain from different ingress points. At each ingress point, the flows do not violate the profiles but overall they do. The intensity of the attack is increased during t=15 seconds to t=45 seconds. The severe attack causes packet drops of more than 35%. Figure 16 shows that the edge-to-edge delay is increased more than 100% in presence of severe attack. The outcome of one round of loss probing is shown in Figure  17 . The distributed schemes detects high losses in links E2 → C2, C1 → C3, C3 → C4, and C4 → E6. The link C4 → E6 has a high loss for a short period of time. Since, some TCP flows adjusted their rates, and it causes the link to be non-congested one again. The egress router for the exiting flows is E6, and ingress routers through which flows enter into the domain are E1, E2, E3, E4, and E5. No traffic came from E7. 
Advantages of Distributed Monitoring
The advantages of using distributed monitoring are as follows:
1. The simple method of distributed probing requires O(n) probes to identify links with a high loss whereas the stripe-based scheme requires O(n 2 ) [16] , where n is number of edge routers in the domain. The advanced method requires O(n) probes when the network is less than 20% congested, however, it does not exceed O(n 2 ) in worst case.
2. The distributed scheme is able to detect violations in both directions for any link in the domain, whereas the stripe-based method can detect any violation only if the flow direction of the misbehaving traffic is the same as the probing direction from the root. To achieve the same result as the distributed monitoring, the stripe-based method needs to probe the whole tree from several different points requiring O(n 3 ) probes.
3. The distributed scheme can use TCP-based loss measurements (e.g. Sting [25] ) to detect losses in both directions in one probe cycle.
4. In the stripe based scheme, two leaves/receivers are probed at a time. It takes a long time to complete probing the whole tree. If all leaves are probed simultaneously, in our example, E1 → C1 link will face huge amount of traffic at that time. On the other hand, the distributed scheme can do parallel probing quite naturally.
Conclusions
We have proposed a distributed network monitoring scheme to keep a domain safe from service violations and bandwidth theft attacks. The network is monitored continuously for unusual high delay pattern. When a delay is high, each edge router probes its neighbors in the overlay tree created on top of the physical network. In our monitoring scheme, we do not measure actual loss of all internal links, instead, we identify all congested links with high losses with edge-to-edge measurements. We provide a simple solution to detect congested links. This method requires fewer probes and identifies congested links when the network is sparsely congested. In other cases, the simple method provides a close approximation of congested links instead of the exact number of congested links. To refine the solution of simple method, an advanced method is proposed. Our solution outperforms the existing monitoring mechanism because they require fewer probes to detect attacks in both directions of a link. The number of probes required for the proposed way of monitoring is significantly low (probe traffic is 0.002% of link capacity for an OC3 links). The simulation results indicate that the proposed scheme detects service violations, bandwidth theft attacks, and DoS attacks caused by flow aggregation towards a victim network domain.
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[ Figure 19 : Intersection of probe paths P and P . If R 2 is an edge router R 2 → R 3 and R 2 → R 4 do not exist.
Proof: Lemma 1. Let the core router c is connected to only two other routers R 1 and R 2 . No probe path can be constructed that either includes the link R 1 → C and does not include C → R 2 or vice versa; or includes R 2 → C and does not include C → R 1 or vice versa. The traffic that passes through the link R 1 → C also passes through C → R 2 . The traffic that passes through the link R 2 → C also passes through C → R 1 . Therefore, for the purpose of probing, a logically equivalent overlay network can be constructed by removing C and replacing the links R 1 → C and C → R 2 with an equivalent single link R 1 → R 2 . R 2 → C and C → R 1 can be replaced by R 2 → R 1 . We say that the link R 1 → R 2 is congested if and only if at least one of the links R 1 → C and C → R 2 is congested, i.e. the bandwidth of R 1 → R 2 is the minimum of the bandwidths of R 1 → C and C → R 2 . Similarly, the bandwidth of R 2 → R 1 is the minimum of the bandwidths of R 2 → C and C → R 1 . 2
Proof: Lemma 4. Let the link R 1 → R 2 ( Figure 19 ) appears in path P in the first round of probing and path P in the second round of probing. If R 2 is a core router, it is connected to at least two other routers, say R 3 and R 4 (Lemma 2). P passes through the link R 2 → R 4 and P passes through the link R 2 → R 3 . Since the tree does not have any cycle, P and P never meet again. If R 2 is an edge router, both P and P terminates at R 2 . Therefore, P and P can not have any common link in their paths after node R 2 . Similarly, it can be shown that P and P can not have common links before they meet at node R 1 . That is |P ∩ P | ≤ 1. 2
Appendix B
Proof: Lemma 5. To determine the average number of paths a link l lies on, we split the overlay network into two subtrees: T 1 and T 2 . The link l lies on an edge-to-edge path whose one end belongs to T 1 and another end belongs to T 2 . Let the number of edge routers in T 1 and T 2 be i and e − i respectively. The total possible paths through l is i(e − i). We observe that the probability that T 1 contains i edge routers is, q i ∝ 2 ln e (for large e).
